I formally explore possible modes of judicial decision-making, varying the inherent trade-off between ideological positioning of case outcomes and coalition formation. From this, I produce three models of judicial ideology and coalition formation, which predict the ideological position of case outcomes and the size of the majority coalition in each case. The models are essentially: first, a minimum winning coalition model, which represents an attitudinalist notion of judicial decision-making; second, a maximum winning coalition, which captures theorized norms of joint opinion writing and collegiality; and third, a constrained ideological model that incorporates the concept of the credibility of threats to defect from a majority outcome when the outcome of cases is too distant from the marginal justice's preferences, constituting a strategic model of judicial decision-making.
Each of these models is capable of producing comprehensive predictions over a continuum of status quos, and can be operationalized as measures. The first measure captures the dominance of the median in median voter theories; its results hinge on the median justice. The second measure approximates a maximum winning coalition; its results hinge on the ideological position of the marginal justice in the coalition. The third measure approximates the mean of the ideal points of the majority coalition; its results hinge largely on the indifference point of the marginal justice in the coalition. Using an estimate of ideological preferences of justices that is constant over time, such as Martin and Quinn's (2002) measure of the dynamic ideal point of Supreme Court justices, these models can make comprehensive predictions about case outcomes under given court compositions. Additionally, they can be applied to empirical analyses of judicial ideology (see Baird and Jacobi, 2006) .
A final point that is apparent from the initial illustration is that coalition formation and case outcome determination, in the form of opinion writing, is as much art as it is science. It is a product of charm, persuasion and other intangibles not captured in any of these models. As such, none of them will perfectly capture the many nuances of the politics and personality that determine the exact placement of cases. Nevertheless, the measures developed use more information -in that they consider coalition size and composition -and so are more nuanced and likely to capture reality than the standard measure of judicial ideology -which looks only to whether a case is labeled "liberal" or "conservative" (see Jacobi and Baird, 2006) .
I. Three Models of Judicial Decision-Making, Ideology and Coalition Formation
This section develops three formal models, which yield predictions over the placement and composition of majorities in the current Supreme Court. It assumes the justices have full information: they know their own position, the positions of their colleagues, and the underlying status quo. The status quo is the outcome prior to Supreme Court action (similar analysis for courts of first instance would be the facts as presented to the court). Each of the models considers judicial ideology in one dimension; this is not to deny that other dimensions may well be salient to traditional decision-makers, but this allows us to examine the relationship between ideological preference maximization and coalition formation most clearly. To the extent that other dimensions exist and are not independent of the ideology dimension, the findings will be affected.
The underlying ideological position of the status quo, SQ x , is key to determining the outcome of the case, because it constitutes the alternative to any proposed majority decision, M x . A vote to affirm is a vote to maintain SQ x . An undecided justice has to choose between supporting the majority ruling at M x or dissenting in favor of maintaining the status quo SQ x . This is a necessary initial simplification: although they are deciding whether to uphold a ruling or provide an alternative, justices can effectively write a dissent or concurrence at any ideological point.
1
I later discuss the impact of concurrences.
Additionally, the proposed majority position will itself be determined by the position of the status quo: whether five justices are willing to sign on to a majority opinion will depend on the ideological distance between the justice and the status quo versus the justice and the proposed majority ruling. i = {J 1 , J 2 , …J 9 } s = (M x , SQ x ) for all s S I assume that, when indifferent, a justice will join a majority. Thus J i will join the majority if J i prefers the majority outcome to the status quo.
The position of M x will also depend upon the relative value justices place on ideology compared to collegial support. Justices forming a majority will face a trade-off between the extent the opinion reflects their ideology and picking up additional votes from their colleagues, whose ideological positions do not mirror their own. I consider three decision rules that capture three contrasting approaches to this inherent trade-off. First, I model the justices as pure "ideologues:" those who prefer that a majority outcome approximating their ideological position in favor of picking up a sixth vote. This decision-making rule is equivalent to a strategy of seeking a minimum winning coalition.
1 In reality, the choice of M x may be affected by whether the decision reverses or affirms: this will act as a constraint on the balance of M x . Here, I ignore this potential constraint; the results can be read as subject to the window allow by this limit. Similarly, other constraints may be operative, such as legal constraints, or the anticipated response of the elected branches, the public etc.
This first model captures the attitudinalist view of justices, which holds that justices decide cases predominantly by reference to there own political preferences (Segal and Spaeth, 1993) . Second, I model the justices as "collegiates:" those who will sacrifice ideological proximity in order to maximize the size of a majority, short of switching sides. This decision-making rule is reminiscent of a maximum winning coalition, with the outcome dependant on the "last justice in" to the coalition. This model captures the view that judicial decision-making is structured by internal judicial norms, particularly of collegiality (Edwards, 1998 ).
The third model requires some preliminary explanation. Under many decisionmaking regimes, a range of possible majorities will often be feasible; the more of an outlier SQ x is in relation to the spectrum of judicial ideal points, the more viable majority alternatives will exist. As we have already seen, the equilibrium M x will depend on rules of judicial decision-making, which represent a preference for ideology versus collegiality.
But it is possible that a decision-making rule can be less absolute than the two considered above; I consider here two further possibilities.
When the marginal justice is indifferent, i.e. when s* is an equality, the marginal justice can credibly threaten to switch sides. If that marginal justice is the median, that threat involves forming a majority with the dissenting justices. The impact of this threat will shape the placement of M x .
Whether this threat is really credible, however, depends on the willingness of the dissenting justices to play ball. Consider a simplified example where justices are uniformly distributed ideologues, and SQ x = J 1 : seven justice, J 3 :J 9 , prefer M x = J 3 , and justice J 2 is indifferent. But six justices, J 4 :J 9 , also prefer any M x = J 4 :J 7 to SQ x . But justices J 1 :J 5 all prefer M x = J 5 to M x`= J 7 ; thus J 4 and J 5 can threaten to switch sides unless M x = J 5 . But credibility of this threat depends on J 1 's willingness to vote for M x = J 5 over SQ = J 1 .
The logic is clear, but what is not clear is whether justices are willing to strategize to this extent. We know that courts have norms of behavior, stemming from the ongoing relationship between the justices, as well as notions of appropriate judicial conduct and ethics (Howard, 1981) .
Rather than make assumptions about the nature of judicial conduct, I again consider different decision-making rules. The first is unconstrained best responses, under which the equilibrium strategy will be:
his decision rule will result in identical equilibrium outcomes, regardless of whether justices are ideologues or collegiates.
The second decision rule is normatively constrained best responses. It dictates that J i will not agree to an alternative majority, M x`, if the distance between J i 's preferences and the status quo is less than the difference between the two proposed rulings:
his second decision rule will result in different outcomes for ideologues and collegiates. Thus I present three sets of equilibrium outcomes resulting from the three different decision-making rules: unconstrained best responses of both ideologues and collegiates (UIC), normatively constrained best responses of ideologues (NCI), and normatively constrained best responses of collegiates (NCC). J 1 :J 4 prefer J 4 to any M x in this range, but if they dissent at SQ x < M x , a five justice majority will exist for M x`e quidistant from SQ x to the right of J 5 . Thus J 5 will be the 9:0 equilibrium outcome under each of the decision-making regimes.
But this result is fairly trivial: it occurs only at the exact cutpoint SQ x = J 5 , and arises out of the assumption that indifferent justices will join the majority opinion. The results are more interesting when we consider a continuum of status quos. If SQ x = J 5 +/-Q, the result will be a 5:4 judgment at M x = J 5 . If liberal movements are negative and conservative movements are positive, and thus the most liberal justice is J 1 and the most conservative justice is J 9 , then for SQ x = J 5 +Q, the result will be a coalition J 1 :J 5 with outcome M x = J 5 . For SQ x = J 5 -Q, the result will be a coalition J 5 :J 9 with outcome M x = J 5 . These results apply for any (J 5 -J 4 )/2 < SQ x < (J 6 -J 5 )/2.
A second example illustrates the difference between the various decision-making regimes. For simplicity, I now consider only alternatives at exactly the nine justices' ideal points, and again use the uniform distribution of justices, but this is relaxed again shortly.
Consider a status quo at J 2 . Seven justices, J 3 :J 9 , prefer M x = J 3 or J 4 ; but a majority of that coalition, J 5 :J 9 , prefer any M x`= J 5 :J 8 to M x = J 4 . Under the normatively constrained collegiate rule, because any movement further right than J 4 will result in a loss of a majority vote, the equilibrium outcome will be 7:2 majority at J 4 .
Under the unconstrained rule, the equilibrium outcome will be a 6:3 majority at J 5 , because J 5 can credibly threaten to switch sides if M x R J 5 . But under the normatively constrained ideological rule, J 1 and J 2 will not agree to support J 5 's threat to defect, as for M x = J 6 or J 7 , the distance they would gain in moving the equilibrium closer to their preferences is less than the distance they lose, being on record supporting a position far from their preferences. A majority J 2 :J 6 would prefer J 5 to J 8 , but the threat necessary to achieve M x = J 5 is not credible, so M x`= J 6 . As such, the equilibrium is a 6:3 majority at J 6 . Table 1 provides a summary of the results when justices are uniformly distributed, for status quos at the ideal points of each of the justices; Figure 1 provides a summary of those results for a continuum of status quos. Table 1 shows the results for liberal status quos; conservative status quos are the mirror image. Otherwise, Table 1 and Figure 1 each consider status quos including the entire ideological spectrum of the court, but also extending beyond the most extreme liberal and conservative justices on the spectrum, to the point that is the ideological mirror of the median, to the left (right) of the most liberal (conservative) justice. Second, unsurprisingly the collegiate rule considerably expands the size of majorities. In fact, under the collegiate rule, we only see split opinions when the status quo lies within the spectrum of judicial ideology, excluding status quos at the exact median (which as discussed is a trivial result arising from the assumption relating to indifference and occurs only at one exact status quo). Any status quo that is more liberal than the most liberal justice, or more conservative than the most conservative justice, results in a unanimous opinion.
But the more striking fact about the collegiate model is that its results are discontinuous. The coalition size continually expands as status quos become more extreme, and consequently the equilibrium outcome tends toward the ideological preferences of the extreme justices. But in every interval between the cutpoint of the inclusion of a new justice and the next such cutpoint, the equilibrium outcome is leveraged back toward the moderate justices. Intuitively, this result seems implausible.
Third, the constrained ideological and collegiate models show two similar patterns: in predicting the approximate size of the majority coalitions, and in predicting the greater influence of the median justices for moderate and extreme status quos, with the greatest influence of the outliers when status quos are extreme but within the spectrum of judicial ideology on the court.
But the difference between these two models predictions is key: they have reverse predictions of the directions of the trends in the equilibrium outcomes for all other status quos. The collegiate model predicts that liberal status quos will result in liberal outcomes, whereas the constrained ideological model predicts that liberal status quos will result in conservative outcomes. This is because liberal status quos give conservative justices the ability to sway the pivotal median justices to a conservative outcome that is nevertheless closer to the median justices' preferences than the liberal status quo. This effect is only operative on the collegiate model for status quos in the interval between judicial ideal points, as discussed above.
It seems likely that judicial norms prevent the median justice from always ensuring that the outcome exactly represents her preferences; however it is overstating the power of judicial norms to suggest that they will prevent majorities from exploiting the ideological distance of extreme status quos to write opinions that better reflect the majority coalition's preferences. As such, the normatively constrained ideological model seems to better capture the trade-off between collegiality and ideology than the collegiate model does.
Finally, under all three models, narrow majorities cluster at the centre; broader court approval exists for status quos that are more extreme. This makes intuitive sense: more extreme facts are likely to give rise to greater agreement among the justices. The only exception is status quos that are exactly equal to the position of the median justice, in which case all of the justices will be indifferent between the alternatives available to them, and each model predicts unanimous judgments where status quos approximate the median. As discussed, this is a trivial result, as every justice is indifferent between the status quo and an outcome at the median.
Overall, it seems likely that the normatively constrained ideologue model will best reflect observed judicial behavior. Unlike the unconstrained model, it predicts variation in outcomes, rather than total domination by the median. At the opposite extreme, the constrained collegiate model expects too much influence of the extremist justices, as it predicts that unanimous decisions will occur everywhere except for status quo lies within the preferences of the centre five justices. NCC predicts that for any status quo outside the ideological range of the justices will exactly reflect the most extreme justice's preferences. This ignores the leverage the moderate justices have to propose a more central alternative to the status quo that the extremist Justice will be indifferent to.
The ideological model captures that interaction, without assuming away all normative judicial constraints. It explains observed variation in judicial behavior, fits with intuitive expectations of how majorities can leverage their strengths to obtain case outcomes that better fit their own preferences, and does not result in discontinuous outcome predictions.
However, the greater nuance of the constrained ideological model makes it more difficult than the other two models to convert into a measure that is useful for empirical models.
I.A The Impact of Concurrences
It is possible to develop a decision-making rule for concurrences, and assess the impact of concurrences on the above results. The results of the unconstrained model and collegiate model will not be affected by concurrences. But the normatively constrained ideological model will be affected. Applying the previous logic, a concurrence rule for the NCI model is:
That is, for Justice i, if the difference from the proposed outcome is greater than the movement the new majority offers from the status quo toward Justice i's preferences, then the Justice will concur. Justice i will concur at J i , or if more than one justice concurs, Justice i will concur at the point that satisfies the normal coalition rule for the potential concurring coalition.
A concurrence rule also requires a rule of response to the concurrence, to see whether the majority will change their position under the threat of a justice leaving the majority to concur. The NCI response rule to a threatened concurrence is:
he effect of the possibility of concurrence does not affect the equilibrium position of the case outcomes under the NCI model, but it does change the size of the coalition for moderate status quos. The differences are: when the status quo is exactly at J 5 , instead of a 9:0 majority at J 5 , there will be a three justice coalition (justices J 4 : J 6 ) for an outcome at J 5 ; justices J 1 : J 3 will concur at J 2 , and justices J 7 : J 9 will concur at J 8 . As the status quo moves towards J 4 , instead of the outcome tracking SQ(J 4 ) with a 5:4 majority, it will be a 4:4 split, with J 9 concurring at J 9 . Then, as the status quo moves from J 4 to (J 5 -J 4 )/2, the outcome will continue to track SQ(J 4 ), but instead of a 6:3 coalition emerging, it will be a 5:4 majority, again with J 9 concurring. When the status quo passes J 4 , until it reaches (J 4 -J 3 )/2, J 8 will join J 9 in concurrence. Beyond that point, the NCI model incorporating occurrences is identical to the NCI model without concurrences.
What this shows is that while the treatment of judicial choice as if it was between joining a majority or dissenting out the status quo is somewhat artificial, it does not drastically affect the results. Giving the justices a choice to concur does not change the outcome, though this extension does explain the observance of split opinions.
II. Creating Measures of Judicial Ideology from the Models
Despite increasing empiricism in the study of judicial politics and behavior (see Epstein and King, 2002) , the primary measure available for this analysis is primitive.
Essentially, the standard measure of judicial ideology -"a latent construct organizing a person's personal political attitudes" (Zorn and Caldeira, 2003) -is to count the number of case outcomes categorized as liberal and contrast them to the number of cases labeled conservative.
traditional judicial ideology dataset, the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 3 there is much more information than the traditional measure takes account of. In particular, as well as knowing the label of liberal or conservative that cases receive, we also know the size and composition of the majority in every case. As such, alternative and arguably superior measures of judicial ideology can be developed, by taking into account the size and composition of the winning coalition, as the three models above do.
Despite the differences of the three models of judicial decision-making developed above, all three are in some ways superior to the traditional model, since they all take into account the significance of the differences among different liberal outcomes, and among conservative outcomes. Unlike the traditional form of measurement, these measures assume that a case that receives approval from the seven most liberal justices is less liberal than a case that receives approval from only the five most liberal justices, but is more liberal than a case that receives unanimous approval. This ensures that a Court that decides a high percentage of unanimous cases in a liberal direction because of an extremely conservative status quo is not incorrectly coded as being overwhelmingly liberal. Assessments of Supreme Court activity should not be a function of the ideological placements of the questions that are presented to the Court, which can change systematically over time.
To develop empirically useful measures of judicial ideology from our three models, we must create operationalizations of them. Finding an exact operationalization for the unconstrained model, is extremely easy. That model consistently predicts that the outcome will be at the exact location of the court median. The operationalization for the UIC measure is:
The normatively constrained collegiate model mimics a "last in" model, when the status quo lies within the spectrum of the ideological makeup of the court. Then, the predicted outcome of the case is the ideal point of the most liberal justice to join the coalition when the coalition is conservative-skewed, and the most conservative justice to join a coalition when the coalition is liberal-skewed. When status quos lie outside the ideological spectrum of the court, the opposing outliers gain influence, drawing the outcome back towards the median.
To operationalize the normatively constrained collegiate model, we define J 1 (SQ x ) as the position to the right of J 1 that makes J 1 in different between that outcome and the status quo, and J 9 (SQ x ) as the equivalent for J 9 . The operationalization for the NCC measure is:
What this means is that the case outcome will be equal to the ideological position of the most extreme justice (in the direction of the status quo) in the coalition, when status quos are within the ideological range of the court; and outcomes will track the indifference point of the most extreme justice (in the direction of the status quo) when outcomes are more extreme than the court's ideological range. What this means is that liberal (conservative) justices have the most power when outcomes are moderately liberal (conservative), but their power decreases the more liberal(conservative)the outcome becomes, once it is more extreme than the court's collective preferences.
The normatively constrained ideologue model largely tracks the indifference point of the median justice to the status quo, but subject to constraints. The leverage that conservative (liberal) justices have when status quos become more extremely liberal (conservative) reaches its limits when the median can credibly threaten to switch sides and form a majority with the liberal (conservative) justices. This creates two bounds on the power of the majority justices to skew the equilibrium outcome toward their preferences: when either the status quo or the case outcome exceeds the third most conservative (liberal) justice (that is, the justice who is the median of a minimum winning coalition), the equilibrium outcome trends back towards the median. As Table 2 shows, on a uniformly distributed ideological spectrum, the difference between the NCI predictions and the mean of the majority coalition proxy measure is at most the standardized interval between two justices. Thus for use in empirical work, while the NCI model cannot be perfectly captured, the theory does nevertheless produce a plausible measure for empirical use. Despite lacking perfect precision in capturing the model, given the inherent weaknesses of the traditional measure, I propose that the NCI measure would be a considerable improvement on the traditional approach.
III. Applying the Models to the Rehnquist Court
This section illustrates the different predictions of the three models by applying them to the Rehnquist Court. To undertake this analysis, we need a valid estimate of the justices' ideological points. Martin and Quinn (2002) Table 3 Table 3 . Table 1 , the data in Figure 2 displays the "cutpoint outcomes," which has the effect of smoothing out the discontinuity in the collegial model. This is done purely for simplicity: the discontinuity is still in effect. Rehnquist. The NCI model then, suggests outcomes will cluster at three points: the median, Souter/Breyer's ideal points, and some liberal status quos will result in outcomes that most closely reflect Rehnquist's preferences.
Applied in this way to specific Supreme Court eras, these models raise empirically testable hypotheses: the UIC model predicts that for the decade that the Court was stable, we will see outcomes consistently at O'Connor's preferences. The NCC model predicts that we will see the full range of the Supreme Court justices' preferences reflected. And finally, the NCI model predicts that we will see outcomes clustering at the three points described above: at the ideal points of O'Connor, Souter and Breyer, and somewhat less so Rehnquist.
IV. Conclusions
This Article has worked from "first principles" of how justices may balance competing desires to have case outcomes reflect their ideological preferences with their assumed preference for a larger coalition, as well as how to balance these preferences with the constraints of judicial norms, to produce three models of judicial coalition formation and outcome determination. An impressionistic assessment of the models' results shows that the unconstrained ideological model and the strongly collegiate model have flaws: one cannot explain variation in case outcomes, the other has discontinuous and arguably anti-intuitive results.
It is possible that the unconstrained ideological model is accurate, and the variation we see is a result of something outside the model, such as the power of the opinion writer. But this explanation implicitly relies on certain assumptions: that justices will sign on to an opinion even when a majority would prefer some other outcome, because of the power of the opinion writer. This implicitly suggests that no purely ideological model is correct, as instead of weighing collegiality, under this explanation justices bow to the norm of opinion writing assignment. In fact, opinion writing assignment is a norm that anecdotal evidence shows will be disregarded when the resulting opinion strays too far from the majority's preferences: according to Justice Douglas' account, on another occasion when Chief Justice Burger attempted to subvert the majority by assigning the case to himself, he eventually had to transform his own opinion, and the majority will prevailed (Epstein and Knight, 1999) .
Other than the discontinuity in the results of the collegiate model, that model also seems inferior to the constrained ideological model, as we should predict that more extreme status quos would increase rather than decrease the majority's power to ensure that its preferences are expressed in the opinion.
As well as providing three models of judicial coalition formation in case determination, this Article also proposed three associated measures of the ideological placement of the Supreme Court's policy outputs. Here, the constrained ideological measure is most problematic, simply because it cannot be expressed as simply as the other two measures. However, parsimony is not everything: the complexity of this measure is essential to its attractiveness as a descriptive mechanism.
Despite their flaws, all three measures proposed here possess an important advantage over the traditional measure, the percentage of liberal decisions. All three models have the advantage that they differentiate very liberal (conservative) outcomes from moderately liberal (conservative) outcomes. This is an essential distinction if empirical studies are to have any precision. We now have three alternative measures of judicial ideology, which each stem from a rigorous theory of judicial choice in coalition formation and outcome determination, and each produce testable hypotheses for assessing the relative merits of the measures.
